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THE NAVY COURT MARTIAL: PROPOSALS
FOR ITS REFORM
ROBERT S. PASLEY, JR. AND FELIX E. LARKIN
Introduction
During World War II, the court-martial systems of both services were
subjected to the most severe test of their history. Some ten million men
made the sudden transition from civilian to service life and found themselves
living in an entirely new community, with its own law and its own courts.
Inevitably, a certain percentage of these men came into conflict with the
law. A system of justice which had its origin in the disciplinary needs of
a small volunteer Army and Navy was suddenly called upon by two tremen-
dous wartime organizations to meet, not only their disciplinary requirements
in the strict military sense, but also to enforce the criminal law as it is ordi-
narily understood in the civilian community. It would be remarkable if
any judicial system could survive such a test without substantial revision.
In the two years since V-J Day, the Articles of War and the Articles for
the Government of the Navy. have been subjected to the most searching
analysis and criticism which they have ever received. Several studies have
been made of the Army court-martial system, by the Army itself, by the
War Department Advisory Committee on Military Justice, the membership
of which was nominated by the American Bar Association, and which was
headed by Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Dean of the New York University School
of Law,' and by the House Military Affairs Committee of the 79th Congress. 2
A bill to amend the Articles of War (S. 903, H. R. 2575) has been intro-
duced in the 80th Congress, and, after extensive hearings, has been reported,
with amendments, by the Armed Services Committee of the House of Repre-
sentatives to the Committee of the Whole.3
In the Navy, there has been a parall8l development. No less than four
separate groups have, at the request of the Secretary of the Navy, reviewed
the Navy court-martial system and have made recommendations for its
modification. A committee, headed by Mr. Arthur A. Ballantine, former
Under-Secretary of the Treasury and prominent New York attorney, has
submitted two reports-one in 1943, and the other in 1946.4 Another com-
1See REPoRT OF WAR DEPT. ADVISORY CoMM. ON MLIrrARY JUsTIcE TO THE SEC'Y OF
WAR (Dec. 1946).2See H. R. REP. No. 2722, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
8H. R. REP. No. 1034, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). See also Royall, Revision of the
Military Justice Process as Proposed by the War Department, 33 VA. L. REv. 269 (1947).4REPORT OF BALLANTINE COMM. TO THE SEC'Y OF THE NAVY (Sept. 1943); REPORT
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mittee, headed by Hon. Matthew F. McGuire, United States District Judge
for the District of Columbia, submitted a report in 1945 which recommended
a complete revision of the Articles for the Government of the Navy, and
included the text thereof as well as proposed rules for court-martial
procedure.5  Father Robert J. White, Dean of Catholic University Law
School and a Commodore in the Navy during the war, has made several
studies of the Articles for the Government of the Navy, and has conducted
a survey of the Navy prison system. His final report contained a number
of recommendations for reform of the Navy court-martial system.6 Finally,
the General Court Martial Sentence Review Board, headed by Professor
Arthur John Keeffe of the Cornell Law School, has submitted a compre-
hensive report on the naval court-martial system which contains numerous
recommendations for reform. 7 Meanwhile, the Navy Department had been
making its own studies, and on the basis of all these surveys has proposed
a bill for amendment of the Articles for the Government of the Navy, which
has been introduced in Congress.8 It is expected that hearings on this bill
will commence in the near future.
It is the purpose of this article to review briefly some of the more impor-
tant features of the Navy court-martial system, the recommendations made
by the above Committees, and the extent to which the Navy court-martial
bill implements or fails to implement these recommendations.
Historical Survey
The American system of naval justice derives directly from the British.
In early times England had no regular Navy but in time of war impressed
OF BALLANTINE CoMM. TO THE SEC'Y OF THE NAVY (April 1946). The latter report
was signed by all members of the Ballantine Committee, but was accompanied by a
special report by one member, Hon. Matthew F. McGuire, and a minority report by
two other members, Lt. Cmdr. Richard L. Tedrow, USNR, and -Lt John J. Finn,
USNR. The other members of the Ballantine Committee were: Professor Noel T.
Dowling, of Columbia Law School, Major General Thomas E. Watson, USMC, Rear
Adm. George L. Russell, USN, (Assistant Judge Advocate General of the Navy),
Rear Admiral John E. Gingrich, USN, Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, USN and
Captain Leon H. Morine, USCG.
5REPORT OF THE McGurmE CoMM. TO THE SEC'Y OF THE NAVY (Nov. 1945). The
other members of the McGuire Committee were Hon. Alexander Holtzoff, U. S. Dis-
trict Judge for the District of Columbia, and Colonel James M. Snedeker, USMC.
6WHITE, A STUDY OF 500 NAVAL PRISONERS AND NAVAL JusTIcE (Jan. 1947).
7REPORT OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE REVIEw BOARD TO THE SEcY
OF THE NAVY (Jan. 1947). The other members of this board, at the time its final report
was submitted, were: Felix E. Larkin, Vice-President, Admiral C. P. Snyder, USN,
Captain Hunter Wood, Jr., USN, Captain John A. Glynn, USCG, Captain Clifford B.
Hines, USN, Lt. Col. E. N. Murray, USMC, and Commander A. W. Dickinson, USNR.8S. 1338 (starred version), H. R. 3687, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
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merchant vessels in order to form one. The personnel of these vessels were
governed by the general maritime law, and by the ancient customs and
usages of the sea. The first code specifically intended to enforce discipline
on naval vessels was the Ordinance of Richard I, of 1190,' which applied
to soldiers, as well as to sailors, and may therefore be regarded as the
common ancestor of our military and naval codes. The first code specifically
applicable to the Navy was the Black Book of the Admiralty, prepared in
1351,10 which may be regarded as the basis of all later British naval codes.
The British Navy was first established as a permanent organization by
Henry VIII, and reached a high state of development under Queen Eliza-
beth. However, naval law remained as before, and no special code was
promulgated by the Crown. Occasionally power was given to an admiral
by patent under the great seal to publish ordinances for the good govern-
ment of the fleet. Many such admiral's codes were promulgated, based
largely on existing law. They provided the models after which later statu-
tory codes were patterned.
The first statute which specifically authorized naval courts martial appears
to have been the Ordinance and Articles of Martial Law for the Government
of the Navy, enacted in 1645.11 The first statute which provided for the
general government of the Navy was passed in 1649, and amended in 1652,
and was known as Cromwell's Articles. This code was a mere restatement
of naval law as it had been administered for some time past, but it remained
the basic naval law until 1749. In that year a new code was enacted which,
however, did not differ greatly from Cromwell's Articles. The Articles of
1749 were in force at the time of the American Revolution.
The first American naval articles were compiled by John Adams, who
took from the British Articles of 1749 those provisions which he considered
suitable. They were approved by the Continental Congress on November 28,
1775, and entitled Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United
Colonies.
The present Articles for the Government of the United States Navy were
enacted by Congress on July 17, 1862.12 This statute consisted of the 1775
Articles revised and brought down to date, with certain additions. There
have been a number of amendments since that date, and forty-five articles
9Reprinted in WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 903 (1895 ed., 1920
reprint).
105 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 125 et seq. (3d ed. 1922). THE BLACK
BooK OF THE ADmImALTY, edited by Sir Travers Twiss, was republished in London in
1871, with a historical introduction.1 1 Lov=ETT, NAVAL CusToMs, TRADITIONS AND USAGES 66 (3d ed. 1939).1 2REv. STAT. § 1624 (1875), 34 U. S. C. A. § 591 (1928).
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have been added. However, aside from the amendments which created sum-
mary courts martial,' 3 and deck courts,14 the present Articles for the Gov-
er'nment of the Navy are not far removed, in content and phraseology, from
the British Articles of 1749, which in turn were substantially Cromwell's
Articles of 1649. It is fair to say then that the proposed naval court-martial
bill represents the first really substantial revision of the Naval Code in
almost 300 years.
Jurisdiction
Since a court martial is a court of limited jurisdiction, the question of its
power to act is of paramount importance. Generally speaking, a naval court
martial has power to try any person in the naval service for any offense
against the Articles, wherever committed. This simple rule is, however,
subject to numerous qualifications,, and the present Articles include a wide
variety of provisions relating to jurisdiction over persons and to territorial
jurisdiction.
(a) Jurisdiction As To Persons
Jurisdiction as to persons is presently covered in several different and
widely separated Articles, which do not themselves purport to deal with
the subject of jurisdiction, and conversely, articles which appear to be juris-
dictional, in fact are not. For example, AGN 4, although headed "Persons
to Whom Applicable," actually deals with offenses which carry the death
penalty. Scattered throughout the Articles are such terms as "any person
in the Naval Service" (AGN 4), "any person in'the Navy" (AGN 8), "any
officer" (AGN 9), "any commissioned .officer of the Navy or Marine Corps"
(AGN 10), "person connected with the Navy" (AGN 12), "persons be-
longing to the Navy" (AGN 22(a), 23). Furthermore, it is necessary to
go outside the Articles and to consult other federal statutes to determine
what persons are subject to naval law. Certain classes of persons are no-
where included, for example: Army personnel attached for duty with naval
units, and persons serving sentences of courts martial whose enlistments
have expired or who have been discharged from the service.
All four of the committees referred to above agreed that this confusing
picture should be clarified. The present Navy bill attenipts to do this by
bringing together in one place all the provisions relating to jurisdiction over
persons, and by specifying in detail what persons are subject to the juris-
diction of naval courts martial.15
1310 STAT. 627 (1855).1435 STAT. 621 (1909), and 39 STAT. 586 (1916).
15S. 1338, H. R. 3687, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 47, Arts. 5(a), 6, 7 (1947).
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(b) Territorial Jurisdiction
At the present time, the general rule that the jurisdiction of naval courts
martial is not limited as to place has one important exception. Naval courts
have authority to try persons charged with murder only if the offense has
been committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
this limitation being applicable in time of war, as well as peace.' 6 This rule
is of ancient origin and is comparable to similar limitations contained in the
British Army and Navy Codes, as well as in the Articles of War.17
This limitation has, however, led to unfortunate results. For example,
prior to 1945, AGN 6 provided that a naval court martial had jurisdiction
to try murder only if the offense had been committed by a "person belonging
to a public vessel of the United States" without the territorial jurisdiction
thereof. In the important case of Rosborough v. Rossell,18 the accused, who
had been tried for an alleged murder committed outside the United States
and had been convicted of manslaughter, brought habeas corpus proceedings
on the ground that he did not belong to a public vessel of the United States
and was therefore not properly charged with murder in proceedings before
a naval court martial. The accused was a member of the naval service but
had been assigned to armed guard duty on a vessel of Panamanian registry,
under the command of a naval officer. The district court upheld the convic-
tion,' 9 but the circuit court of appeals reversed and granted the writ, sus-
taining the contention of the accused. Although this result may be justified
by a literal reading of the statute, it had unfortunate consequences. The
Navy was compelled to set aside a number of murder convictions, to grant
1 6REv. STAT. § 1624, Art. 6 (1878), as amended, 59 STAT. 595, 34 U. S. C. § 1200
(1945).17The other rules are not identical, however. The Articles of War provide that, in
time of peace, an accused shall not be .tried by court-martial for murder or rape com-
mitted within the geographical limits of the States of the Union and the District of
Columbia. 41 STAT. 805 (1920), 10 U. S. C. A. § 1564 (1927), ARTIcLE OF WAR 92.
The British Army Act prevents British Army courts martial from trying cases of
treason, murder, manslaughter, treason, felony, or rape, if these offenses can, with reason-
able convenience, be tried by a civil court. A court-martial is consequently prohibited
from trying any such offense if it is committed in the United Kingdom, or anywhere
else in the Dominions (except Gibraltar), within 100 miles from the place where the
offender can be tried by a civil court, unless the offense is committed on active service.
Army Act, 44 and 45 Victoria, c. 58, § 41 (1881); MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW 103(1929 ed., 1939 reprint). The British Naval Discipline Act limits the jurisdiction of
naval courts martial so that, as to most civil offenses, jurisdiction is limited to acts
committed outside the United Kingdom, or on naval shore establishments, harbors,
rivers, and so forth, within the United Kingdom. Naval Discipline Act, 29 and 30-
Victoria, c. 109, Art. 46 (1866).18150 F. 2d 809 (C. C. A. 1st 1945).
1956 F. Supp. 347 (D. C. Me. 1944).
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new trials in some cases, to turn other offenders over to local civil courts,
and in still other cases to declare itself powerless to do anything.20
As a result of the Rosborough case, Article 6 has been amended so that,
instead of reading:
"If any person belonging to any public vessel of the United States
commits the crime of murder without the territorial jurisdiction there-
of, he may be tried by court-martial and punished with death."21
it now reads:
"If any person subject to the Articles for the Government of the Navy
commits the crime of murder without the territorial jurisdiction of any
particular State, or the District of Columbia, he may be tried by court
martial and punished with death." 22
Although this amendment cures the specific difficulties raised by the Ros-
borough and other cases, it does not solve the real problem, which is that,
so long as any limitation on territorial jurisdiction remains, some kind of
confusion and difficulty will probably arise.
For this reason, the General Court Martial Sentence Review Board recom-
mended that all jurisdictional limitations based on place be eliminated, even
in the case of murder.28 There is no reason in logic for the rule that a court
martial can try the offense of murder only when committed overseas, but
can try all other offenses wherever committed. If courts martial cannot be
trusted to try serious offenses, the remedy is not to deprive them of juris-
diction, but to improve their processes and method of trial and review so
that the grounds for such mistrust are removed. This was the approach
adopted by the General Court Martial Sentence Review Board throughout
its report.
It was recognized by the Board that considerations of policy might well
lead to the decision that certain civil offenses of a serious nature should be
tried by civilian courts, especially in peacetime, but it was felt that to accom-
plish this it was not necessary to place ]urisdictinoml limitations on courts-
martial. All that would be required would be to vest in the Secretary
of the Navy the power, by regulation, to refer to the civil authorities such
civilian offenses as policy required should be handled by them, leaving courts
20See Snedeker, Significant Developments in Naval Law Sinwe Pearl Harbor, 73 U. S.
NAVAL INST. PRoc. 663 (1943).
21RE€. STAT. § 1624, Art. 6 (1875), 34 U. S. C. § 1200, Art. 6 (1940).
22As amended Dec. 4, 1945, c. 554, 59 STAT. 595 (1945), 34 U. S. C. A. § 1200, Art. 6
(Supp. 1946).23 RPoRT OF GENERAL COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE REVIEw BOARD TO THE SEC'Y OF
THE: NAvY, Sec. VIII (3), pp. 260-265 (Jan. 1947).
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martial free to try such cases when necessary, without being haunted by the
specter of jurisdiction. This recommendation, while completely novel, is
implemented in Section 47 of the Navy Bill, which provides simply that
"The Articles for the Government of the Navy shall extend to all places."1
2 4
No similar change has been suggested by anyone with respect to the Articles
of War, or, so far as is known, even considered. The pending bill to amend
the Articles of War, specifically retains the limitation presently contained
in AW 92.25
Offenses
It is a fundamental principle of Anglo-American law that no one should
be punished for an offense which the law does not prohibit in so many
words. The maxim, indla poena sine lege, is. a familiar statement of this
principle. Unfortunately, the present Articles for the Government of the
Navy are woefully lacking in this respect. Some offenses are specifically
provided against, but are scattered throughout some eighteen different
articles. The remaining offenses are covered by one broad provision, Article
22(a), which provides for the punishment of "All offenses committed by
persons belonging to the Navy which are not specified in the foregoing
articles." Many important civil offenses, such as manslaughter, rape, rob-
bery, and assault, are nowhere mentioned, although Article 22(a) has been
construed as comprehending common law crimes, provided they are injurious
to the order and discipline of the Navy.26 Many common law offenses and
various military offenses are also punishable under Article 8(1), which
makes punishable "any other scandalous conduct tending to the destruction
of good morals."' 27 One of the most common complaints voiced in naval
circles is that the present Articles fail to tell anyone in language which the
ordinary person can understand what acts are punishable offenses and what
are not.
All the above named committees agreed that this situation was in need of
correction, although their actual recommendations on the subject differed
widely. The McGuire Committee recommended that the Articles incorporate
by reference violations of (1) the criminal laws, treaties, or covenants of
the United States, (2) the criminal laws of a state, territory, or United
24S. 1338, H. R. 3687, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 47, Art. 5"(c) (1947).
25S 903, H. R. 2575, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 35, Art. 92 (1947).
20See Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S. 365, 397, 22 Sup. Ct. 181, 193 (1901) ; Ors.
AT-r'y GEN. 579 (1880). See also WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 721
(2d ed., 1920 reprint) on the corresponding provision of the Articles of War.2 7NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDS § 59 (1937 ed., 1945 reprint); Ex parte Dickey, 204
Fed. 322 (D. C. Me. 1913).
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States possession, (3) the lawful orders and regulations of the Secretary
of the Navy, and (4) the customs of the Naval Service, or of the laws of
war, and recommended that they also include (5) "recognized military
offenses, as defined by the Secretary of the Navy." No further detail, were
given, except that offenses punishable by death were specifically listed, and
it was provided that the definition of offenses and the measure and mode
of proof were to be those prevailing in the courts of the United States.28
Commodore White submitted several drafts containing provisions similar
to those of the McGuire Committee draft, but listing, without defining them,
some thirty-two specific military and common law offenses.2 The majority
report of the Ballantine Committee did not go into the question in detail.
Judge McGuire's statement and the minority recommendations proposed
adoption of the McGuire Committee draft articles, with some minor
revisions.80
The General Court Martil Sentence Review Board made the following
recommendations: (1) That all punitive provisions be grouped together
under one general heading, but be divided into two classes-capital offenses,
and those not capital; (2) That the several offenses most likely to occur in
the naval service be specifically listed under one or the other of these two
classes; (3) That the most common military offenses be similarly listed; and
(4) That Article 22(a), be deleted, and that in its stead it be stated that
offenses against the Articles include violations of the criminal laws, treaties,
and covenants of the United States, violations of the regulations and cus-
toms of the service, and violations of the laws of war. The Board also
recommended that there be included a general provision making punishable
all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline, all
conduct of a nature to bring discredit to the naval service, and all offenses
not capital.8 '
The proposed Navy Bill represents a compromise among these various
recommendations. All military offenses are brought together and classified
under two headings: Article 8,32 which includes capital offenses, specifically
listed, and Article 9,3s which includes non-capital offenses, also specifically
28Articles 2(d) and 4(c) (4) of draft Articles submitted with REPoRT OF McGuIRE
COMM. TO THE SEC'Y OF THE NAVY (Nov. 1945).
29 STUDIES 1, 2, AND 3, by- Commodore Robert J. White, of the ARTICLES FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE NAvY (undated).
80REPORT OF THE BALLANTINE COMM. TO THE SEc'Y OF THE NAVY (April 1946).3 1 REPORT OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE REVIEW BOARD TO THE SEC'Y
OF THE NAVY 301, Sec. IX(A) (Jan. 1947).
32S. 1338, H. R. 3687, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, Art. 8 (1947).
331d. at § 11, Art. 9.
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listed. Article 5(d) 34 incorporates by reference violations of the criminal
laws of the United States, treaties and covenants of the United States, the
criminal laws of a stite, territory, district or possession, violations of naval
regulations and customs, and violations of the laws of war. There is also a
general provision, Article 9(61),3 which covers "any disorder or neglect
to the prejudice of good order and discipline or any conduct of a nature to
bring discredit upon the naval service other than any disorder or neglect
or conduct mentioned in these Articles." Some common law offenses, such
as forgery, burglary, housebreaking, seduction, embezzlement, and ektortion,
are specifically mentioned, but others, such as murder and manslaughter,
seem to have been omitted from the offenses enumerated. Nevertheless, the
bill has the merit of listing most of the offenses made punishable by the
Articles and making it clear to any one who reads them, or hears them
read, what is and what is not prohibited. This is a reform long overdue.
Composition of Courts
Of prime importance in any judicial system is the caliber of the personnel
who man the courts. In civilian life, we have attempted to solve this problem
by the jury system. Most Americans and Englishmen believe that a court
comprised of a professional judge and a jury of fellow citizens, who are
selected by lot, with full opportunity of challenge, together with" a public
prosecutor and defense counsel of the accused's choice, both professional
lawyers, will, by and large, administer justice as well as is humanly possible.
In the court-martial system all this is changed. There is no judge and
no jury. The right of challenge is, in the Navy, limited to challenges for
cause. In the naval court martial, an officer who is called the judge advocate
serves both as prosecutor for the government and as legal adviser to the
court. A defense counsel is designated by the convening authority, but his
services may be declined by the accused. An accused has a right to counsel
of his choice, but the right is exercised in only a small percentage of cases.
There is no statutory requirement that either the judge advocate or the
defense counsel be professionally qualified.
(a) Appointment of Courts Martial
A court martial itself is appointed by a "convening authority" (usually
the commander of a fleet, a marine division, a naval district, or the like),
either for the trial of a specific case or a series of cases. The only statutory
34Id. at § 47, Art. 5(d).
Id. at § 11, Art 9(61).
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requirement for membership is that those appointed be commissioned officers.
By administrative rule, members must be of the rank of lieutenant (or
captain in the Marine Corps), if available.36 The senior officer present
automatically assumes the office of president of the court.
Before the war, general courts martial could be appointed only by the
President or the Secretary of the Navy, the commander in chief of a fleet
or squadron, or the commanding officer of an overseas station. Shortly after
Pearl Harbor, the Secretary, pursuant to statutory authority,3 7 empowered
all flag officers commanding a division, squadron, flotilla, or larger naval
force afloat to convene general courts martial.38 But the centralization in
W¥ashington of the power to appoint most general courts martial led to such
delay in the trial and review of cases that in July 1943 the Ballantine Com-
mittee recommended that, pursuant to AGN 38, the commandants of the
naval districts in the United States be empowered to convene general courts
martial. This recommendation was immediately adopted. The Ballantine
Committee pointed out, however, in its 1943 report, that the power of the
Secretary to authorize commanders within the United States to convene
general courts existed only in wartime, and recommended that this power
be made permanent.3 9 The McGuire Committee, in 1945, made a similar
recommendation. 40 In 1946, Article 38 was amended by Congress to carry
these recommendations into effect. 41 The present Navy Bill makes no change
in this Article, as thus amended, except to renumber it Article 22.42
(b) Permanency of Courts
Under existing Army and Navy procedures, there is no permanency about
a court martial. A court may be appointed to try a single case, or a series
of cases; it may cease to function the following day, or it may continue
as originally constituted for months, or even years. The composition of a
court may be changed at any time by the convening authority.43 The Con-
3 6 NAvAL COURTS AND BOARDS § 346 (1945 reprint).3 7 REv. STAT. § 1624 (1875), as amended, 35 STAT. 621 (1909), 39 STAT. 586 (1916),
34 U. S. C. A. § 1200 (1928), A. G. N. 38.
3SSee, e.g., Letter from the Sec'y of the Navy to the Commander in Chief, U. S.
Fleet, (Navy Dept. file A17-11 (i)/A17-20 (420108), dated 8 January, 1942).
3 9
REPORT OF THE BALLANTINE CoMMa,. TO THE SEC'Y OF THE NAvy, Recommendation 1,
pp. 3, 14-16 (Sept. 1943).4 0
REPORT OF THE McGuiRE Co111. TO THE SEC'Y OF THE NAVY, Article 4(a) of Pro-
posed Revised Articles (Nov. 1945).
4160 STAT. 4, 34 U. S. C. A. § 1200, Art. 38 (1946).
42S. 1338, H. R. 3687, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 28, Art. 22 (1947).
43See comments on this by RHEINSTEIN, MILITARY JUSTICE IN WAR AND THE LAW
155, 162, 167 (ed. Puttkamer, 1943), and by Morgan, The Existing Court Martial Sys-
tent and the Ansell Articles, 29 YALE L. J. 52, 60 (1919).
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vening authority of a naval court martial may even replace members during
the course of a trial, although this practice is condemned.4
Before the war, general courts martial which were more or less permanent
in character had been appointed at a number of naval bases within the
United States.4 5 Even during the war, the general courts martial established
for the naval districts in the United States were relatively permanent. Over-
seas, of course, this was not so feasible.
There are certain obvious advantages in having courts martial comprised
of experienced, relatively permanent personnel, although it must be con-
ceded that occasionally such courts tend to become callous and to impose
unconscionable sentences.4" A few tentative suggestions in this direction have
been made. The Chamberlain Bill to amend the Articles of War, introduced
in 1919, provided that, instead of the convening authority appointing the
members in each case, he should designate a panel of qualified court mem-
bers, and that for each trial the judge advocate, who was to be independent
of the convening authority, should select the members of the court from
this panel.4 7 This proposal was not adopted in the 1920 revision of the
Articles of War.48 No comparable proposal is made in the pending Army
bill. 4
9
The Report of the General Board, United States Forces, European Thea-
ter, on Military Justice Administration in the Theater of Operations, gave
some attention to proposals to establish permanent courts martial. 0 Perma-
nent courts are used, at least in peacetime, in the court-martial systems of
France5' and of Russia. 2
The McGuire, White, and Ballantine Reports had no recommendations to
make with respect to permanent courts, or panels for courts. The General
Court Martial Sentence Review Board considered this question at some
length. Its recommendations were that: ,
(1) The system of appointing relatively permanent courts within the
United States be strengthened and extended.
4 4 NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDS §§ 348, 380 (1937 ed., 1945 reprint).45McNemar, Administration of Naval Discipline, 13 GEO. L. J. 89, 119 n. 82 (1925).
"
1 6 REPORT OF THE GENERAL BOARD, UNITED STATES FoRcEs, EUROPEAN THEATER, ON
MILITARY JUSTICE ADM INISTRATION IN THEATERS OF OPERATION, W. D. File, 250/1,
Study No. 83, p. 46 (1946).
47S. 64, H. R. 367, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919).
4841 STAT. 787 (1920); 10 U. S. C. §§ 1471-1593 (1940).
49S. 903, H. R. 2575, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
GoWar Department File 250/1, Study No. 83, p. 46 (1946).51McNeil, French Courts Martial, W. D. A. M. J., May 15, 1946.52McNeil, Russian Courts Martial, W. D. A. M. J., May 15, 1946.
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(2) So far as compatible with operations, overseas courts be appointed
on a permanent basis.
(3) Consideration be given to a panel system of selecting court members.
(4) Appointment of a new member to a court after arraignment be pro-
hibited, except where necessary to complete the minimum membership.53
Recommendation (4) is adopted, at least in part, in the pending Navy
Bill.54 Recommendations (1) and (2) have, it is understood, been approved
for administrative adoption. Recommendation (3) is not implemented by
the Navy Bill, nor, so far as known, has it been approved for administrative
adoption.
(c) Number of Members
A relatively minor change in the Navy system relates to the number of
members required for a general court martial. At present the Navy follows
the rather archaic rule that "as many members, not exceeding thirteen, as
can be convened without injury to the service shall be summoned on every
such court," although the only strict requirement is that there be five.5 In
practice, the full complement of thirteen is rarely appointed.
The Ballantine Committee recommended that the maximum number be
reduced to nine.56 The McGuire Committee proposed adoption of the Army
rule, that a minimum of five, with no maximum, be set. The General Court
Martial Sentence Review Board concurred with this recommendation, 57 and
it is adopted in the Navy Bill.
5 8
(d) Qualificaoions of Court Members
The General Court Mdrtial Sentence Review Board was the only one of
the above named committees to consider at any length the important ques-
tion of the qualifications of court members. Its recommendations were,
briefly:
(1) That all officers be required to take a course in naval law;
(2) That a minimum period of two years' service be required for mem-
bership on a court martial;
5 3 REPORT OF THE GENERAL Cotter MARTIAL SENTENCE RLvimw BOARD TO THE SEC'Y
OF THE NAVY, Sec. IV (3), p. 68 (Jan. 1947).
54S. 1338, H. R. 3687, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. § 34, Art. 27 (1947).
55REv. STAT. § 1624, Art. 39 (1875), 34 U. S. C. § 1200, Art. 39 (1940), A. G. N. 39.56 REPORT OF THE BALLANTINE COML. TO THE SEC'Y OF THE NAVY, p. 4, Recommenda-
tion 4 (Sept. 1943); REPORT OF THE BALLANTINE CoMM. TO THE SEC'Y OF THE NAVY,
p. 7, Recommendation D (April 1946). The minority report recommended a maximum
of 7. Id. at 25.5 7 REPoRT OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE REVIEW BOARD TO THE SEc'Y
OF THE NAVY, Sec. IV (4), p. 70 (Jan. 1947).'
58S. 1338, H. R. 3687, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 29, Art. 24(a), (1947).
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(3) That prospective members of courts martial be required to attend
a prescribed number of trials for purposes of instruction;
(4) That the rule making ensigns and lieutenants junior grade ineligible
to sit on courts martial be reconsidered.
5 9
None of these recommendations would require statutory implementation,
and none are covered in the Navy Bill. It is understood, however, that (1),
(2) and (3) will be put into effect administratively, and that, as to (4),
specially qualified ensigns and lieutenants junior grade will be made eligible.
(e) Enlisted Men as Court Members
The General Court Martial Sentence Review Board was the only Navy
committee to give any consideration to the controversial question whether
enlisted men should be eligible to sit on courts martial. After reviewing
the arguments, the Board concluded that such a step would probably not
improve the caliber of courts, would not be in the interest of enlisted men
themselves, and might create more problems than it solved. The Board sug-
gested, however, that the question be given very careful consideration before
being dropped finally, and recommended that, if the rule were to be changed,
the following safeguards should be imposed:
(a) Certain minimum qualifications of education and service should be
required;
(b) The presence of enlisted men on a court should be optional with an
accused; and
(c) Enlisted men should not be appointed to a court in excess of a full
minority thereof. 60
The present Navy Bill follows the recommendations of the General Court
Martial Sentence Review Board in not making enlisted men eligible for
membership on courts martial. In this, it differs from the Army Bill, which,
following the recommendations of'the Vanderbilt Report, provides that war-
rant officers and enlisted men shall be eligible to serve on courts martial,
the former where deemed proper by the appointing authority, the latter when
requested by an accused in writing, and provides further that no enlisted
man who has made such a request shall, without his consent, be tried by a
court which does not have at least one-third of its members enlisted men. 61
59REPORT OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE REVIEW BOARD To THE SECY
OF THE NAvy, Sec. IV (2), p. 60 (Jan. 1947).601d. at Sec. IV (2), pp. 53-61.
61S. 903, H. R. 2575, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, Art. 4 (1947).
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(f) Provision for Independent Judge Advocate
It has been recognized by all'who have studied the naval court-martial
system that one of its greatest deficiencies has been the absence of any
requirement that there be present on the court a legally qualified expert to
pass on questions of evidence and procedure. Since 1920, the Army general
court martial has had a "law member," who is specially designated by the
appointing authority to perform these functions.6 2 lie is a full fledged mem-
ber of the court, with the right to vote and otherwise participate in the
proceedings. He is required to be a member of the judge Advocate General's
Department, except that when a member thereof is not available for this
purpose, the appointing authority shall detail instead an officer of some other
branch, selected as specially qualified. 63 During World War II, because of
the shortage of judge advocate officers, it was the exception rather than the
rule for one to be appointed as law member, (the exceptions usually being
cases of especial complexity or seriousness), although judge advocate officers
were frequently detailed as trial judge advocate. Under the proposed amend-
ments to the Articles of War, it is required that the law member be an officer
of the Judge Advocate General's Department, or an officer who is a member
of the bar of a federal court or of the highest court of a state, and certified
by the Judge Advocate General to be qualified for such detail. It is further
required by the pending bill that the law member be actually present during
the entire trial and during the voting.64
The committees which studied the naval system were unanimous in recom-
mending a similar requirement for the naval general court martial.65 In lieu
of the Army system, however, these committees recommended that the British
system be followed, under which an independent officer, known as the judge
advocate, is appointed, who rules on all legal matters arising during the
trial, but who is not a member of the court as such, and has no vote. It was
felt that, by leaving the judge advocate free to perform his duties in a wholly
impartial manner, without being required to participate, in the actual judg-
ment of the accused, a greater measure of justice could be achieved. It
was further recommended that the present judge advocate, who is required
6241 STAT. 788 (1920); 10 U. S. C. § 1479 (1946), ARTICLE OF WAR 8.63Ibid.
64S. 903, H. R. 2575, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6, Art. 8 (1947).
6 5REPORT OF THE BALLANTINE COMM. TO THE SEc'Y OF THE NAvY, p. 4, Recom-
mendation 5 (Sept. 1943); REPORT OF BALLANTINE COMMITEE TO THE SEc'Y OF THE
NAVY, Recommmendation B, p. 6 (April 1946); REPORT OF McGunr Comm. TO THE
SEy' OF THE NAVY 5-6 (Nov. 1945); WHITE DRAFT ARTICLES, Art. 10(b)(4);
REPORT OF GENERAL COURT MARTIAL SENTENcE REvIEw BOARD TO THE SEc'Y OF THE
NAvy, Sec. IV(4), pp. 71-85 (Jan. 1947).
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to fill the dual function of prosecutor and of legal adviser to the court, be
abolished, and his duties divided between the new judge advocate and the
prosecutor.
Minor differences developed among the committees as to the exact scope
of the duties of the judge advocate, the finality of his rulings, his responsi-
bility to higher command, and the like. The recommendations of the General
Court Martial Sentence Review Board on this subject were:
(1) That a judge advocate be provided for every general court martial
and, when practicable, for every summary court martial.
(2) That he be an officer whose qualifications have been approved by
the Judge Advocate General.
(3) That he be subject only to the supervision of the Judge Advocate
General, and not of the convening authority, in the performance of his
duties as judge advocate.
(4) That his instructions on the law applicable to the case be made
in open court and be set forth in the record, that the court determine
guilt or innocence in accordance therewith and on the basis of the facts
found by it, and that on review -prejudicial error in the instructions of the
judge advocate be ground for reversal.
(5) That careful consideration be given to the question whether the
rulings of the judge advocate on evidence and interlocuttory questions
should be made binding on the court. 60
The Navy Bill implements recommendations (1), (2), and (3), so far as
the general court martial is concerned.67 With respect to recommendations
(4) and (5), the bill provides that the duties of the judge advocate shall be:
"(1) to advise the court on all matters of law arising during the trial
of the case; (2) to rule on interlocutory questions except challenges;
(3) in open court, to instruct the court upon the law of the case; and
(4) to perform such other duties as the Secretary of the Navy may
prescribe: Provided, That the judge advocate may be overruled by a
majority vote of the court, in which case the reasons therefor shall be
spread upon the record. .. .
The Navy's reasons for inserting the last proviso are understood to be
based upon the feeling that an anomalous situation would be created if the
judge advocate, who might be a junior officer, could impose his judgment
6 6REPORT OF THE GENERAL. COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE REVIEW BOAM TO THE SEC'Y
OF THE NAvY, 84-85 (Jan. 1947).
67S. 1338, H. R. 3687, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 29, Art. 24(6) (1947).
6Ibid.
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on the rest of the court, who might all be senior to him. The Navy believes
that, as a practical matter, the judge advocate will rarely be overruled, be-
cause of the requirement that in any case where he is overruled, the reasons
therefor be spread upon the record.
Whatever may be thought of the proviso, the introduction of an inde-
pendent judge advocate is.a salutary reform, and one of the most important
reforms contained in the entire bill.
(g) Prosecutor and Defense Counsel
Parallel with the introduction of the judge advocate as law officer of the
court would, of course, be a change in the status of the present judge advo-
cate. The latter at present occupies the anomalous .position ;f both prose-
cutor and legal adviser to the court. All of the committees have recommended
that this be changed, the present judge advocate be confined to his duties
as a prosecutor, and that, to avoid confusion, his name be changed to
prosecutor.
The draft articles submitted by the McGuire Committee and by Commo-
dore White proposed merely that the prosecutor be a person qualified to
perform his office. 69 The General Court Martial Sentence Review Board
went further and recommended that the prosecutor's qualifications be ap-
proved by the Judge Advocate General, that he be a lawyer whenever
practicable, and that he be subject only to the supervision of the judge
Advocate General in the performance of his duties as prosecutor.7 0 The
Navy Bill carries out this recommendation, in part, by providing that for
every general court martial the convening authority shall appoint a prose-
cutor who shall be certified by the Judge Advocate General as a person
qualified to perform his duties as such.71 The Bill also provides that for
every summary court martial the convening authority shall appoint'a prose-
cutor who shall be qualified to perform his duties as such.72
One of the weakest features of the present court martial system is the
method of providing defense counsel. There is no requirement in the present
articles that a defense counsel be appointed by the convening authority. How-
ever, Naval Courts and Boards provides that the convening authority, or the
commanding officer of the command in which the trial is held, shall designate
69 REPORT OF THE McGuIRn COM. TO THE SEC Y OF THE NAVY, PROPOSED REVIsED
ARTICLES, 4(b) (3) (Nov. 1945); WHITE DRAFT ARTICLES, § 10 (b) (3).
70 REPORT OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE REVIEW BOARD TO THE SEWcY
OF THE NAvY, Sec. IV (6), pp. 92-93 (Jan. 1947).
71S. 1338, -. R. 3687, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. § 29, Art. 24(b) (1947).721d. at § 19, Art. 18(b).
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a defense counsel, unless the accused selects his own or declines to be repre-
sented by counsel.73
The General Court Martial Sentence Review Board made a statistical
analysis of the first 413 cases reviewed by it, and concluded that a creditable
effort had been made to assign qualified lawyers as prosecutors and as de-
fense counsel. Nevertheless, the Board felt that the system could be strength-
ened considerably. Accordingly, along with its recommendations as to
appointment of the prosecutor, it recommended that a defense counsel be
appointed for every general court martial and, where practicable, for every
summary court martial. This was not to affect the present right of an ac-
cused to counsel of his own choice, civilian or naval. It was, however, strong-
ly recommended that the practice of allowing a man to go to trial before
a general court martial without being represented by any counsel be elimi-
nated. The Board also recommended that the qualifications of the defense
counsel beapproved by the Judge Advocate General, that he be subject only
to the supervision of the Judge Advocate General in the performance of his
duties as defense counsel, and that the Judge Advocate General make every
effort to see that the defense counsel was of equal ability with the prosecutor.
The Board further recommended that it be required in each case that the
defense counsel attach to the record a brief on appeal respecting such legal
points as he deemed appropriate, or a statement over his signature that in
his judgment no such brief was necessary, and also that it be a part of his
duty in appropriate cases to take all necessary steps to present substantial
jurisdictional or similar questions to the proper civil tribunal. 74
The Navy Bill adopts these recommendations, in part, by providing that
for every general court martial the convening authority shall appoint a
defense counsel, who shall be certified by the Judge Advocate General as a
person qualified to perform his duties, as such, but that the appointment of
such defense counsel shall not affect the right of the person accused to coun-
sel of his own choice.7a The Bill also provides that for every summary court
martial the convening authority shall appoint a defense counsel, who shall
be a person qualified to perform his duties as such, but that this shall not
affect the right of the accused to counsel of his own choice.76 The Bill fur-
ther provides as follows:
"In every court-martial proceeding in which the accused pleads not
73 NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDS § 357 (1937 ed., 1945 reprint).7 4RP EPORT OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE REVIEW BOARD TO THE SEC'Y
OF THE NAVY, Sec. IV(6), pp. 85-94 (Jan. 1947).
75S. 1338, H. R. 3687, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 29, Art. 24(b) (1947).
76Id. at § 19, Art. 18(b).
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guilty, defense counsel, if there be one, shall, in the event of conviction,
attach to the record of proceedings either a brief of such matters as he
feels should be considered on behalf of the accused on review or a signed
statement setting forth his reasons for not so doing.' 77
Challenges
Present Navy court martial procedure provides for challenges for cause,
to be determined by a majority vote of the court, but makes no provision
for peremptory challenges.78 In this respect, it differs somewhat from the
Army .procedure, which permits one peremptory challenge to each side
(except that the law member of a general court-martial may be challenged
only for cause).79 In the British Army and Navy, challenges for cause are
allowed, but there is no provision for peremptory challenges. In neither sys-
tem is the judge advocate subject to challenge. 80
The McGuire Committee recommended that the tirosecution and the
accused each be given the right to challenge any member for cause, with a
provision that each challenge should be determined by the judge advocate.8 '
No provision was made for challenging the judge advocate himself. The
General Court Martial Sentence Review Board followed this recommenda-
tion, but suggested that the prosecution and the defense counsel each be
allowed one peremptory challenge, and that provision be made for a petition
for disqualification of the judge advocate.82
The Navy Bill makes no change in the present procedure, except to make
it statutory, and to provide that the judge advocate shall be subject to chal-
lenge. Challenges are not to be determined by the judge advocate, but by
the majority vote of the court, as at present.8 3 Thus, even under the Navy
Bill, there remains a difference between the Army and Navy systems, in that
one peremptory challenge is allowed to each side under the former, but not
under the latter.
Rules of Evidence
At the present time there is no statutory requirement that naval courts
77Id. at § 47, Art. 38.
78NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDS, §§ 387-392 (1937 ed., 1945 reprint).
7941 STAT. 790 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1489 (1940), ARTICLE OF WAR 18.
S0 British Army Act, 44-5 Vicr., c. 58, § 51 (1881); BRITISH RULES OF PROCEDURE,
Rule 25; BRIrsH MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW 478, 633; British Naval Discipline Act
29-30 Vicr., c. 109, § 62 (1866); BaITISH NAVAL COURT-MARTIAL REGULATIONS,
Art. 446.
81 REPORT OF McGuIRE CoMM. TO THE SEC'Y OF THE NAVY, PROPOSED RULES OF PRO-
CEDURE, Rule 5 (Nov. 1945).
8 2REPORT OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE REVIEW BOARD TO THE SEC'Y
OF THE NAVY, Sec. VI(1), pp. 133-137 (Jan. 1945).
83S. 1338, H. R. 3687, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 29, Art. 24(b) (1947).
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martial are bound by any particular rules of evidence. Naval Courts and
Boards does set forth some of the more common rules of evidence which are
Jeclared binding on courts martial, but its presentation of this subject is
far from compl~te.84 In actual practice, confusion often arises in trials when
opposing counsel argue for conflicting rules, each citing state court precedent
to support his view. The court has no standard or guide to which to turn.
The McGuire Committee felt strongly that this situation should be cor-
rected and that rules of evidence should be clearly set forth in a revised
edition of Naval Courts and Boards, and that such rules should, so far as prac-
ticable, follow the rules of evidence of the United States district courts.8 5
The present Navy Bill implements this recommendation by providing that
the "Secretary of the Navy is authorized to prescribe, and to modify from
time to time, the rules of pleading and procedure, including modes of proof,
in proceedings before naval courts martial, other naval tribunals, and fact
finding bodies as will insure the enforcement of discipline and the fair and
impartial administration of justice in the United States Naval Service,
provided, that, insofar as applicable, such modes of proof shall follow the law
of evidence prevailing in the district courts of the United States in the trial
of criminal cases ....
This provision is similar to the present provision of Article 38 of the
Articles of War, which authorizes the President to prescribe rules of evidence
for Army courts-martial, "which regulations shall, insofar as he shall deem
practicable, apply the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of
criminal cases in the district courts of the United States. 87 An admirably
concise statement of these rules, the work of the late Professor John H.
Wigmore, is contained in the Manual for Courts-Martial.8 8
Vote on Findings and Sentence
Under present Navy court-martial procedure, the vote on findings and on
the sentence is determined by a simple majority, a tie being resolved in
favor of the accused, except that a two-thirds vote is required for imposition
of the death sentence. 9 In this, the practice differs from the Army, where
a two-thirds vote is required for a finding of guilty (except where the death
penalty is mandatory, in which case unanimity is required), and for deter-
84NAvAL COURTS AXD BoARDs, C. III (1937 ed., 1945 reprint).
S5 RFORT OF McGuiRE CoMM. To THE SEC'Y OF THE NAVY, PROPOSED RULES OF PRO-
CEDURE, p. 8, Rule 10 (Nov. 1945).
86S. 1338, H. R. 3687, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. § 47, Art. 48 (1947).
8741 STAT. 794 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1509 (1940).
8 8 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, C. XXV (1928).
8 9 REv. STAT., § 1624, Art. 50 (1875), 34 U. S. C. § 1200, Art. 50 (1940).
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mination of the sentence, with the added proviso that if the sentence is
longer than ten years, a three-fourths vote is required, and if the death
sentence is to be imposed, a unanimous vote (on the sentence, but not on
the findings) is required. 90 Army and Navy practice also differ in that in
the former the vote is by secret, written ballot and in the latter by signed
ballot, although in both cases the vote is taken in closed court. 91 Another
important difference between the two systems is that in the Army system
the results of the voting are announced at the conclusion of the trial, whereas
in the Navy system no announcement is made until the sentence has been
reviewed and approved, which may be several weeks or even months later.
An acquittal on all charges and specifications is, however, announced
immediately.92
The General Court Martial Sentence Review Board recommended that
these Navy rules be .reconsidered, that provision be made for a secret, written
ballot, that more than a majority vote be required to convict and to impose
sentence, that a unanimous vote be required for conviction and sentence if
the death penalty is imposed, and that the findings and sentence be announced
in open court at the conclusion of the trial. 93
The Navy Court-Martial Bill provides as follows:
(1) That every finding shall be determined by a majority vote, and
that a tie vote shall result in acquittal;
(2) That the death sentence may be imposed only by unanimous vote,
that a sentence of life imprisonment or confinement for more than
ten years shall require a three-fourths vote, and that all other sen-
tences shall require a two-thirds vote;
(3) That the court shall announce its findings and sentence, and any
recommendations for clemency, in open court as soon as deter-
mined.94
There is no provision in the Bill for secret, written ballot, but it is understood
that such a provision is to be adopted administratively.
Senteicing Power of Courts Martial
The sentences 'imposed by courts martial are perhaps the most widely publi-
cized, feature of the court martial system. They are generally regarded as
9041 STAT. 794 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1514 (1940), ARTICLE OF WAR 43. See Sabel,
Court Martial Decisions by Divided Courts, 28 CORNELL L. Q. 165 (1943).
9141 STAT. 793 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1502 (1940), ARTICLE OF WAR 31; NAVAL
COURTS AND BOARDS § 425 (1937 ed., 1945 reprint).92 NAvAL COURTS AND BOARDS § 433 (1937 ed., 1945 reprint).9 3REPORT OF THE GENERAL COURT MIARTIAL SENTENCE REVIEW BOARD TO THE SEC'Y
OF THE NAVY, Sec. VI (9, 11), pp. 158-164, 175-181 (Jan. 1947).
138S. 1338, H. R. 3687, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 39, Art. 39(e) (1947).
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severe and as being in -excess of civilian sentences for comparable offenses,
although this is by no means always the case.
The conventions and rules which surround a court martial in imposing sen-
tence are undoubtedly the cause, at least in part, of the heavy sentences
which are imposed. The command function inherent in the idea of military
discipline is in large measure the source of the, concept that the primary
sentence function of a court martial is to impose an adequate sentence, com-
mensurate with the offense, if not the maximum allowed by law, and to leave
questions of mitigation and clemency to the convening authority. Thus,
Article 51 of the Articles for the Government of the Navy provides:
"It shall be the duty of a court martial, in all cases of conviction, to
adjudge a punishment adequate to the nature of the offense; but the
members thereof may recommend the person convicted as deserving of
clemency, and state, on the record, their reasons for so doing." 95
Similarly, Section 444, Naval Courts and Boards, provides:
"It is made by law the duty of courts martial, in all cases of conviction,
to adjudge a punishment adequate to the nature of the offense committed.
In so doing due regard must be had to the requirements of the Articles
for the Government of the Navy and the limitations prescribed by the
President for punishments in' time of peace. In cases where there has
been evidence in mitigation or extenuation, a court martial may recom-
mend the person convicted to clemency; this clemency, however, is to
be exercised only by the reviewing authorities, who are expressly clothed
with the power to mitigate or remit punishment. Sentences must be
neither cruel nor unusual, and must accord with the common law of the
land and the customs of war. .. ."
Moreover, under present procedures, the sentence does not become
effective until it has been approved by the convening authority. In most cases,
the sentence is reduced at this point. Frequently, it is further reduced upon
subsequent departmental review. The sentence actually served often bears
little relation to the one originally imposed. Unfortunately, the result is
that the ultimate sentence is determined by those far removed from the trial,
and no single agency makes a comprehensive study of the sentence factors
involved in a case.
The sentencing of convicted persons, whether in civilian life or in military
service, is a difficult problem, and is not susceptible of scientific processes.
Nevertheless, the naval sentencing procedures were criticized by the Ballan-
tine Committee in it first report, and that Committee recommended that
9 5 REv. STAT., § 1624, Art. 51 (1875), 34 U. S. C. § 1200, Art. 51 (1940).
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increased discretionary sentence powers be given to courts martial. 96 The
General Court Martial Sentence Review Board concurred with the Ballantine
Committee and took the position that, while subsequent clemency undoubtedly
rested with higher authorities, the determination of a fair sentence, after all
the facts and circumstances had been considered, was not a matter of clem-
ency but involved the exercise by a judicial authority of impartial judgment,
discretion, and justice. The Board felt that a more precise justice would be
achieved if sentences were based on full consideration of the problems of the
individual, in balance with the paramount social interest of protecting mili-
tary discipline, efficiency and morale. The Board expressed the view that no
single factor-either the individual's problems on the one hand or military
necessity on the other-should be wholly controlling, and that the best
method of giving recognition to the study of the sentence factors in a case
was to put the responsibility in the hands of the court itself.97
The right to consider matters in mitigation and extenuation in the imposi-
tion of sentences is authorized in the British Army Manual for Military
Law,9" and in the British Naval Manual. The latter provides:
"In awarding sentence, the court should take into consideration former
services and any other claims which the accused may lay before them
with a view to his being dealt with more leniently. It is objectionable
for a court to award a sentence and then to recommend a prisoner to
the favorable consideration of the Admiralty. Such a course throws a
responsibility upon others which properly belongs to the court." 99
The Manual for Courts Martial of the United States Army provides:
In the exercise of any discretion the court may have in fixing
the punishment, it should consider, among other factors, the character
of the accused as given on former discharges, the number and character
of previous convictions, the circumstances extenuating or aggravating
the offense itself, or any collateral feature thereof made material by the
limitations on punishment."'10 0
Nevertheless, the general Army view, in line with the Navy, has been to
consider the exercise of clemency as essentially the prerogative of the review-
ing authority, and to consider any undue leniency on the part of the court
as an invasion of the reviewing authority's proper province.
9 6
REPORT OF BALLANTINE CoMM. TO THE SEC'Y oF THE NAVY, Recommendation 14,
pp. 5, 23-25 (Sept. 1943).9 7 REPORT OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE REVIEW BOARD TO THE SEC'Y
OF THE NAVY, Sec. VI (10, 11), pp. 164-181 (Jan. 1947).9 8 MANUAL FOR MILITARY LAw, par. 77, p. 60 (1929 ed., 1939 reprint).
9 9 MANUAL OF NAVAL LAW AND COURT MARTIAL PROCEDURE 88-90 (4th ed. 1912).
1 OOMANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, par. 80, p. 67 (1928).
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The present Navy Bill provides:
"It shall be the duty of a court martial, in all cases of conviction, to
adjudge a punishment adequate to the nature of the offense; but the
members thereof may recommend the person convicted as deserving of
clemency, and state, on the record, their reasons for so doing."' 01
This does not appear to represent any substantial change in present pro-
cedures; in fact, the language is identical with the present Article 51. How-
ever, when this section is read in connection with the changes made in the
reviewing function of the convening authority, to be discussed below, it
does appear that a step has been taken in the direction of imposing greater
initial responsibility for the sentence on the court. The extent of any change
actually made in this respect chn only be determined when it is seen how
the new procedures are administered in practice.
Review by the Convening Authority
The present system of reviewing naval court-martial proceedings is a
complicated one, and has been subjected to perhaps as much criticism" as
any other part of the court-martial system. If the trial court finds an accused
guilty and imposes a sentence, the first step is a review by the convening
authority. In addition to reviewing the proceedings, findings, and sentence
for legality, the convening authority also reviews the sentence from a clem-
ency standpoint. As a matter of fact the sentence of a court-martial is not
self executory and becomes effective only when it has been approved by
the convening authority. The convening authority has the power to remit
or mitigate a sentence, to remit all or part of it conditionally on probation,
or to disapprove it. He also has the power to disapprove the findings in
whole or in part.10 2
Under present naval law, the convening authority can theoretically dis-
approve and return a finding of not guilty, and can also direct revision of
a sentence with a view to increasing its severity. It is provided in Naval
Courts and Boards, however, that the convening authority shall not return
a finding of not guilty, or direct revision of a sentence with a view to in-
creasing its severity, without the prior authority of the Secretary of the
Navy.103 This power has been rarely used and is finally eliminated in the
pending Navy Bill.104 A similar step was taken, with respect to Army law,
101S. 1338, H. R. 3687, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 47, Art. 28 (b) (1947).
20 2REv. STAT. § 1624, Arts. 53, 54 (1875), 34 U. S. C. § 1200, Arts. 53, 54 (1940),
A. G. N. 53, 54.
'
03 NAVAL COURTS AND Bo~mms § 477 (1937 ed., 1945 reprint).
104S. 1338, H. R. 3687, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 39, Art. 39 (1) (1947).
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in the 1920 revision of the Articles of War.10 5
In reviewing a case, the convening authority normally refers it to his
staff legal officer, who prepares an opinion and recommendations for his
signature. The convening authority usually follows the advice of his legal
officer, although he is not obliged to do so.
Without question, this iniiial review by the convening authority affords
substantial protection to the accused. It provides a means of detecting errors
in the trial and of correcting' excessive sentences. If the errors are fatal, or
are substantially prejudicial, the proceedings can be disapproved, or a new
trial offered to the accused. 10 If the sentence is excessive, the convening
authority can reduce it. Even if the sentence is not excessive, the convening
authority can reduce it by way of clemency, or he can extend clemency in
other ways, such as by remitting the sentence conditionally on probation.
Furthermore, this review is obligatory and is thus in the nature of an auto-
matic appeal granted to every accused, regardless of whether he requests it.
Despite these advantages, the practice of having an initial review by the
convening authority has been criticized, and is a subject upon which ob-
servers of the court-martial system have differed violently.10 7 The objections
to an .initial review by the convening authority may be summarized as
follows:
(1) The reviewing authority is usually the same officer who convened
the court and referred the case to trial. There is a certain anomaly in having
the same officer review a case who has considered it at some length before
it went to trial. It is humanly impossible for a person, no matter how high
his purpose, to dissociate himself completely from his prior actions and
opinions on a particular matter and to view it later as though he were seeing
it for the first time. It is a difficult position in which to place anyone, espe-
cially one who is in the position of administering justice. (This observation
should not, however, give rise to the inference that convening authorities,
in reviewing cases, have in fact acted unfairly.) ' s
(2) The review of a court-martial case is not really analogous to an
appeal. Rather, it is a necessary first step which must be taken before the
10541 STAT. 795 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1511 (1940), ARTICLE Or WAR 40.
108 NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDS § 447 (1937 ed., 1945 reprint).
'o
7 See, e.g., Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs
of the United States Senate on S. 64, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 544-5 (1919) ; REPORT OF
THE GENERAL BOARD, USFET, MILITARY JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION IN THEATER OF
OPERATIONS, War Department File, 250/1, Study No. 83, par. 55, pp. 45-46.
'
0 SThe General Court Martial Sentence Review Board, in its INTERIM REPORT FOR
THE PERIOD ENDING JUNE 30, 1946, reported that, after reviewing some 2,000 general
court-martial trial records, it found no evidence or indication that convening authorities
had acted unfairly.
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findings and sentence have any effect at all. Furthermore, although counsel
for the accused has the privilege of submitting a brief, he does not ordinarily
do so and rarely resorts to oral presentation of the case to the convening
authority or his legal officer. Although, theoretically, each objection to evi-
dence and each ruling of the court is weighed on this review, it is difficult
under such a procedure to detect all the errors which may exist.
(3) The practical result of the initial review is that the convening
authority, rather than the court, ultimately determines the sentence. In a
great number of the cases, the court merely fixes a maximum limit to the
sentence, which is actually determined by the convening authority, within
that maximum.
(4) The convening authority's power of review carries with it a certain
measure of indirect control over the court and its actions. As already pointed
out, the convening authority selects the members of the court and prefers
the charges. If he does not agree with the findings of the court, or believes
that the sentence is inadequate, he can express his opinion in his action or
in a letter to the, court. If he is dissatisfied with the findings of the court,
he may consciously omit selecting its members for future cases. These powers
cannot but have an effect, however indirect, on the action of the court.
The justification for the convening authority making the initial review
is found in the traditional view of the services that the court martial is pri-
marily an instrument for the maintenance of discipline. Thus, it is stated
in Naval Courts and Boards, with reference to Naval courts martial:
"The jurisdiction thus conferred is exclusively criminal in character,
being solely for the purpose of the maintenance of Naval discipline."'10 9
Since discipline is a function of command, it is natural that the court-martial
should have developed historically as an extension of the authority of the
commander.
The crux of the situation occurs in trying to determine the exact relation-
ship and balance between "discipline" on the one hand and "justice" on the
other. The whole problem is extraordinarily difficult and no pat solution
suggests itself. There are those who have recommended the complete elimi-
nation of the review by the convening authority. This was the proposal, of
the Chamberlain Bill of 1919 to amend the Articles of War."0 It was,
however, not adopted. In this connection, it is interesting to note that under
109 NAVAL COURTs AND BOARDS § 327 (1937 ed., 1945 reprint).
110S. 64, H. R. 367, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919). See Morgan, The Existip.'Court-
Martial System and the Ansell Articles, 29 YALE L. J. 52 (1919).
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the French court-martial system no review by the convening authority is
provided."'
An examination of the recent studies made for the Navy reveals a differ-
ence of opinion on this subject. Neither the Ballantine Reports nor the
McGuire Report mentioned the question of review by the convening author-
ity, except insofar as the first Ballantine Report touched upon it in making
its recommendations for decentralization.1 2 The revised articles proposed
by the McGuire Committee and by Commodore White all proposed retention
of the present system, with certain modifications. For example, Article 5(a)
of the McGuire draft articles provided that every sentence of a Naval court
martial not extending to death, dismissal or discharge could be executed
upon approval of the convening authority, who would have power to remit
or mitigate, but not to commute, such sentence. The excepted cases would
require confirmation by-the President or by the Secretary of the Navy.
The General Court Martial Sentence Review Board was of the opinion
that the problem could not be solved by minor reforms and suggested that
the review by the convening authority be eliminated. The Board was of the
opinion that the command responsibility of the convening authority was
paramount up to the point of selecting the members of the court and referring
the charges to trial. Once the case had been referred to trial, however, it
was felt that the entire responsibility for the proceedings, from the time of
arraignment to the sentence, should be that of the court." 3
The position of the Navy at the present time on this question is disclosed
by the provisions of the pending Navy Bill. This bill provides:
"ART. 39. (a) Every punishment, except death, dismissal, discharge,
or reduction in rank. or rating, imposed by the sentence of a general
court martial shall be executed upon announcement of the sentence by
the court: Provided, That reduction in rank or rating shall be effective
upon the date of the forwarding of the record of proceedings by the
convening authority to the Navy Department without having remitted
or suspended the reduction in rank or rating: Provided further, That
a discharge shall be executed only after confirmation by the Secretary
of the Navy or of other authority duly appointed by him; that a dis-
missal shall be executed only after confirmation by the President or,
when empowered by the President, by the Secretary of the Navy; and
"'See Hearngs before Subcommittee of Committee on Military Affairs on S. 64,
66th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, pp. 554-5 (1919).
-1 2REPoRT OF THE BALLANTINE CoMM. TO THE SEC'Y OF THE NAVY 10,. 11 (Sept.
1943).1 1 3REPORT OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL SENTENcE REVIEW BOARD TO THE SEC'Y
or THE NAVY, Sec. VII (1), pp. 189-206-A (Jan. 1947).
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that a punishment of death shall be executed only after confirmation by
the President.
"(b) The convening authority of any court martial shall have the
power to remit or mitigate, but not to commute, the punishment im-
posed by the sentence of any court martial convened by him.
"(c) Every punishment imposed by the sentence of a summary court
martial, except discharge or reduction in rank or rating, or of a deck
court martial, except reduction in rank or rating, shall be executed upon
announcement of the sentence by the court: Provided, That a discharge
shall be executed only after confirmation by the Secretary of the Navy
or of other authority duly appointed by him: Provided further, That
reduction in rank or rating shall be executed upon the date of forward-
ing of the record of proceedings by the authority exercising the power
of legal review to the Navy Department without having remitted or
suspended the reduction in rank or rating. 1 1 4
The Bill further provides:
"The Secretary of the Navy is authorized and directed to issue such
regulations as may be necessary to assure that the members of every
court martial shall be free to perform their sworn duties without any
coercion or influence, directly or indirectly, on the part of any person
in the naval service."' 1 5
Thus, it appears that the Navy, while in no way repudiating the importance
of the command function, has considered that some of the criticisms levelled
against the present system of initial review by the convening authority have
merit, and hence has asked Congress to eliminate a considerable portion of
the authority presently exercised by him in this regard, and to restrict him
to a clemency function solely. Conversely, the authority and importance of
the court are enhanced, and its findings and sentence, like those' of a civilian
court, are made self-executory, subject only to review for clemency by the
convening authority, and to review for legality and clemency by the Depart-
ment, with special departmental reviews provided for sentences of death,
dismissal, or discharge. This reform marks a radical break with tradition.
It is hoped that it will accomplish the desired result of enhancing the pres-
tige, dignity, and independence of the naval court martial.
In this connection, it is interesting to compare the recommendatibns of the
Vanderbilt Committee on the subject of review by the Army appointing
authority. The following excerpts state the Committee's position:
"1. The Manual for Courts-Martial, United States Army, should
114S. 1338, H. R. 3687, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 39, Art. 39 (a) (b) (c (1947).
1151d. at Art. 39 (j).
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provide that it is improper and unlawful for any person to attempt to
influence the action of an appointing or reviewing authority or the action
of any court-martial, general, special, or summary, in reaching its ver-
dict or pronouncing sentence, except persons connected with the work
of the court, such as members of the court, attorneys, and witnesses;
and this prohibition should be made expressly applicable to the appoint-
ing or reviewing authority.
"2. The Manual should also contain an express prohibition against
the reprimand of the court or its members in any form.
"3. The Manual should contain a statement that it is the duty of
courts-martial to exercise their own judgment in imposing sentences
and that they should not pronounce sentences which they know to be
excessive, relying on the reviewing authority to reduce them.
"6. The need to preserve the disciplinary authority of the command
and at the same time to protect the independence of the court can be
met in the following manner. The authority of the division or post
commander to refer a charge for prompt trial to a court appointed by a
judge advocate should be absolute. The commander should, of course,
be furnished with a judge advocate to advise him with reference to the
disposition of the charge. The right of the command to control the
prosecution, and to name the trial judge advocate, who should be a
trained lawyer, should be retained. The Judge Advocate General's De-
partment, however, should become the appointing and reviewing author-
ity independent of the command. For this purpose the present organi-
zation of the Judge Advocate General's Department may be sufficient
and the power to select and review its judgment should normally rest
with the Staff Judge Advocat at Army level, so that the members of
the court may be selected from a wider area and the perennial problem
of disparity of sentences in similar cases may be at least partially solved.
It may be best in certain instances to place the authority on a higher
level, or in case of war or in case of units established at a distance from
the command, to delegate the authority to a division or smaller unit. We
believe that the flexibility of such a system will aid in the solving of
many problems and will permit the establishment of permanent courts
or travelling courts if they be found desirable. Article of War 8 should
be amended to accomplish this purpose.
"7. The special understanding that officers of a division or command
have of local conditions lead us also to recommend that the general or
other officer who referred the case for trial should have the power to
mitigate, suspend, or set aside the sentence. In order to effectuate this
recommendation the record should be first sent by the court to the
officer who referred the case for trial so that he may have an oppor-
tunity to act upon the sentence and it should be his duty to act promptly
and forward the record to the reviewing authority for final action. The
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power of the command in this respect should be limited to the question
of clemency."" 6
However, the Army Bill to amend the Articles of War does not carry out
these recommendations, except insofar as it prohibits reprimands of, and
attempts to influence, courts-martial, nor are they carried out in the bill which
has been reported favorably by the House Armed Services Committee."L 7
The Navy Bill, interestingly enough, adopts them almost in toto, although
it does not include any provision relating to reprimands.
Departmental Review
After the initial review by the convening authority, there is presently pro-
vided a departmental system of review of all court martial cases. Every
record of trial by general court martial is reviewed as to legality in the Office
of the Judge Advocate General. If there has been. a conviction, and a sentence
imposed, the case is then reviewed as. to disciplinary features in the Bureau
of Naval Personnel (or the Discipline Branch of the Marine Corps). In a
certain number of cases, further action is taken in the Office of the Secretary
of the Navy, and, in cases where accused are serving prison terms, a further
periodical clemency review was formerly provided by the Clemency and
Prison Inspection Board.
The legal review provided in the Office of the Judge Advocate General
consists of a review of the entire record in Section A, Military Law Division,
by one or more officers acting under the supervision of the Chief of the
Section. Difficult cases, in which the reviewing officer has doubts as to
legality, and cases involving controversial issues of law or fact are, after
initial review in Section A, and after review by the Chief of the Military
Law Division and by the Assistant Judge Advocate General, referred to a
Board of Review which has been established within the Office of the Judge
Advocate General. This board reviews the case much as a civilian court of
appeal would do and submits its conclusions and recommendations to the
Judge Advocate General. The Board, however, is not created by statute,
and its recommendations are not binding upon the Judge Advocate General.
The final responsibility for advice to the Secretary as to the legal sufficiency
of every case rests upon the Judge Advocate General himself.
All general court martial cases, after review by the Judge Advocate Gen-
'
1 6 REPORT OF WAR DEPT's. A VIsORY COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE TO TEE SEC'Y OF
WAR 7-10 (Dec. 1946).
117S. 903, H. R. 2575, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 23, Art. 47 (d) (e) (f) (1947),
id. at § 33, Art. 88; H. R. REP. No. 1034, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
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eral, if found legally sufficient, and if there has been a conviction and sentence,
are referred to the Chief of Naval Personnel or to the Commandant of the
Marine Corps for comment as to the disciplinary aspects of the sentence.
The latter examine the sentences from the standpoint of conformity with
department policy and of uniformity with other sentences in like cases, and
also consider any mitigating or extenuating circumstances which may be
present. If the sentence is approved, the case is returned to the* Office of
the Judge Advocate General and is filed there.
In the event that the Judge Advocate General questions the legal sufficiency
of a case, or the Chief of Naval Personnel (or Commandant of the Marine
Corps) recommends reduction or other action on the sentence, the case is
transmitted to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. Although the recom-
mendations of the Judge Advocate General and of the Chief of Naval Per-
sonnel (or Commandant of the Marine Corps) are purely advisory, they
are normally followed by the Secretary.
The Secretary's power to act on court martial sentences derives from
Article '54(b) of the present Articles, which gives him the authority to
set aside the proceedings or to remit or mitigate, in whole or in part, the
sentence imposed by any naval court martial convened by his order or by
that of any officer of the Navy or the Marine Corps."1 8 This section gives
the Secretary almost complete reserve power over the sentences of all naval
courts martial, except those appointed by the President.
In addition, certain other cases, in which the sentence extends to death,
or dismissal of a commissioned or warrant officer, require confirmation by
the President before execution. During the war, the power of confirmation
in dismissal cases was delegated to the Secretary and the Under-Secretary. 2 0
The confirming authority has all the review powers of the convening author-
ity, plus the power of commutation.121
The last phase of the departmental review formerly consisted of the parole
function of the Naval Clemency and Prison Inspection Board. The purpose
of this review was to re-appraise the records of accused who were confined
in naval penal institutions. This Board, in addition to studying the record
of trial, studied the recommendations of the-local prison officials and examined
the behavior and psychiatric reports of the accused. If the Board felt that
i1,8REv. STAT. § 1624, Art. 54 (b) (1875), 34 U. S. C. § 1200, Art. 54 (b) (1940),
A. G. N. 54 (b).19 REv. STAT. § 1624, Art. 53 (1875), 34 U. S. C. § 1200, Art. 53 (1940), A. G. N. 53.
120ExeC. Order No. 9556, 10 FED. REG. 6151 (1945). The power to confirm a sentence
of death was not delegated.
121NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDS § 481 (1937 ed., 1945 reprint).
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further clemency should be extended, it so recommended to the Secretary
of the Navy. Again, although its recommendations were purely advisory,
they were usually followed... :,
This system of departmental review has been criticized as inadequate.
Moreover, the moving of a case from one office to another, each of which
gives a partial appraisal, has been condemned as time consuming and ineffi-
cient. In addition, specific criticisms have been made of the individual steps
in this procedure. It has been alleged, for example, that the legal review
in the Judge Advocate General's Office is not conducted in such a way as to
be the equivalent of a comprehensive review on appeal.' 22 Again, the role
of the Bureau of Naval Personnel in the administration of naval justice
has been highly controversial. The McGuire Report stated:
"The Bureau of Naval Personnel, as previously indicated, should be
completely divorced from the administration of naval justice-its inter-
ests being primarily post factum."'123
The proposed McGuire Articles implemented this recommendation by mak-
ing no reference to the Bureau of Naval Personnel. On the other hand, the
Ballantine Report stated:
"The Board believes that participation of the Bureau of Naval Per-
sonnel and the Commandant of the Marine Corps in review serves a
useful purpose." 12 4
With respect to review in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, it has
been felt that the action of the Secretary in reviewing the recommendations
of the Judge Advocate General, the Chief of Naval Personnel (or Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps), and the Clemency and Prison Inspection
Board, suffers from a number of handicaps. In the first place, the Secretary
is without benefit of advice from one centralized agency, with power to make
recommendations on all court-martial matters. Some cases come to him from
the Judge Advocate General with the recommendation that the proceedings
be disapproved for legal insufficiency. Others come from the Bureau of
Naval Personnel with a recommendation for mitigation of sentence. Some
come from the Clemency and Prison Inspection Board with a recommenda-
tion for additional clemency. In most instances, the Secretary cannot exam-
ine these cases in detail and, consequently, must refer them to members of
122See, e.g., Recommendations of Minority Member of Ballantine Committee in
REPORT OF THE BALLANTINE COMM. TO THE SECY OF THE NAvY 6 (April 1946).
12 3REPORT OF McGunE Comm. To THE SEC'Y OF THE NAVY 9 (Nov. 1945).
124 REPORT OF BALLANTINE COMrM. TO THE SEC'Y OF THE NAVY, Recommendation G,
p. 8 (April 1946).
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his staff for opinion and advice. In this way, a single case may pass through
several offices, with several distinct recommendations before reaching the
Secretary. The action finally taken by the Secretary in many cases may not
represent any single recommendation made to him, but a compromise of a
number of views.
Moreover, an anomaly is presented by the fact that, once the Secretary
has taken definite action on a case, by reducing the sentence for example,
that case is closed and may not be subsequently reopened. 125 On the other
hand, if he has never taken action, for example, in a case where the original
sentence was allowed to stand, the way is open for subsequent disapproval
by him under Article 54(b). Yet in both cases, the arguments for recon-
sideration may be equally meritorious.
As a result of these criticisms, various recommendations for revision of
the system of departmental review have been made by the different com-
mittees. The McGuire and Ballantine Committees and Commodore White
recommended that the legal review in the office of the Judge Advocate be
continued, but that there be created one or more Boards of Review, estab-
lished in the Executive Office of the Secretary of the Navy.
The McGuire Committee recommended that the Secretary of the Navy,
prior to final action, submit to the Board of Review the record of every court
martial in which a conviction followed a plea of not guilty and in which
the final action contemplated extended to death, dismissal, dishonorable dis-
charge, bad conduct discharge, or confinement in excess of twelve months.
The McGuire Committee further contemplated that the Board of Review
would review all such records, both as to legality and as to disciplinary
features, and would submit recommendations thereon to the Secretary of the
Navy via the judge Advocate General. The Judge Advocate General would
endorse thereon his concurrence or his non-concurrence and the reason there-
for, and would transmit the entire record to the Secretary for his decision.2 6
As observed above, this procedure contemplated elimination of the Bureau of
Naval Personnel. The revised articles proposed by Commodore White were
substantially similar in this respect to those proposed by the McGuire
Committee. 1 27
The majority report of the Ballantine Committee recommended that a
12511 Ors. ArT'v GEN. 137 (1865); CMO No. 2-1943, 145. However, for a ruling
that such a case may be reopened on the grotina that new evidence has been discovered,
see CMO No. 1-1944, 92.12 6 REPORT or McGuiRE CoIIM. TO THE SEC'Y OF THE NAVY, PROPOSED REVISED
ARTICLES, Art. 6 (Nov. 1945).12 7WHITE DRAFT ARTICLES (1st and 2d Studies), Art. 14.
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Board of Review be established to consider such cases as the Secretary of
the Navy deemed appropriate, and that, where the Board disagreed with the
prior review of the Judge Advocate General, or of the disciplinary activity
involved, the record be returned to the Judge Advocate General for recon-
sideration and further recommendation, before being presented to the Secre-
tary of the Navy for final approval.128 As stated above, the Ballantine Com-
mittee proposed retention of the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the Marine
Corps in the review procedure.
In addition, all three committees recommended that, whatever type of
Board of Review be established, there be at least one civilian member with
a legal background.
The approach of the General Court Martial Sentence Review Board to
this subject was to proceed, not from the assumption that the present system
was defective, but rather, granting its merits, to consider whether it could
not be placed on a firmer and more secure foundation. The Board concluded,
however, that any comprehensive revision of the review system should elimi-
nate participation by the Bureau of Naval Personnel, or the Marine Corps,
as such. The Board stated that, in view of the highly punitive nature of
many sentences, a review of a sentence extended beyond the factor of main-
taining discipline, and that, while the Bureau of Naval Personnel was well
equipped to pass sentences from a disciplinary standpoint, it was not staffed
with expert lawyers or penologists trained and equipped to view each case
as a whole, giving due regard to all the factors of environment, education,
training, and medical and psychiatric condition, which, in addition to purely
disciplinary features, should enter into the determination of an appropriate
sentence.129
In addition to recommending the elimination of the Bureau of Naval
Personnel and the Marine Corps in the review procedure, the Board also
recommended the elimination of the legal review in the Office of the Judge
Advocate General, and suggested that the entire departmental review be
placed in two Boards of Review. The first would be for legal review only.
This Board would automatically review all convictions by general courts
martial, and any conviction by an inferior court which was appealed to it.
'
2 8 REPORT OF BALLANTINE CoMMi. TO THE SEc'y OF THE NAVY, Recommendation C,
p. 6 (April 1946). Judge McGuire and the two minority members dissented from this
portion of the report of the majority, and recommended that the original recommenda-
tions of the McGuire Report on Boards of Review be adhered to.
1 2 9 REPORT OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL SENTENcE REVIEw BOARD TO THE SEcY
OF THE NAVy, Sec. VII, 2 A (2), pp. 210-213; Sec. VII, 2 C (6), pp. 230-233 (Jan.
1947).
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It would have the power to review and determine the legal sufficiency of the
proceedings, findings, and sentences in cases of not guilty pleas, and the legal
sufficiency of the proceedings and sentence in cases of guilty pleas. In making
its review, it would have the power to weigh the facts, as well as to pass
upon the law.
The argument of the General Court Martial Sentence Review Board was
that a complete and thorough going review of legal questions was the first
consideration in any system of review, and that this review should be made
by a Board which was similar to a court. It was further recommended that
the decisions of this Board on legality should be final within the Navy
Department. In this way, centralized responsibility for all decisions as to
legality would be fixed. It was also suggested that a civilian lawyer be
made the head of this Board.130
Once the question of legal sufficiency had been settled, and only then, was
it felt that the question of appropriateness of the sentence should arise.
Accordingly, the General Court Martial Sentence Review Board recom-
mended that the sentence, in all its ramifications, including the elements
of discipline and of morale, be next reviewed by a Sentence Review Board.
It was recommended that the Sentence Review Board, in addition to a
civilian lawyer, be composed of representatives of the different bureaus and
branches of the Navy, including the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the
Marine Corps. Recommendations of the Sentence Review Board would be
made directly to the Secretary r Under-Secretary of the Navy, but unlike
the decisions of the Board of Legal Review, would not be binding on the
Secretary. It was felt that, since sentence review involved matters of disci-
pline and policy rather than of strict law, none of the reasons which rendered
it advisable to make the opinions and findings of the Board of Legal Review
final applied in the case of sentence review. If no change or modification
of the sentence was recommended, submission to the Secretary would not
be necessary. 131
The General Court Martial Sentence Review Board also made the follow-
ing recommendations concerning review by the Secretary:
(1) That the provision for confirmation of sentences of death and dis-
missal be retained. It was felt, however, in view of the provisions for a
Board of Legal Review and a Board of Sentence Review, a complete review
de nov'o of these cases would not be necessary.
(2) That any sentence of discharge of an enlisted man require approval
1301d. at Sec. VII, 2 C (5), pp. 222-230.
'
1 1ld. at § VII, 2 C (6), pp. 230-233.
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of the Secretary, or of his duly designated representative, before being ordered
into execution.
(3) That the periodic clemency review be retained, but that it be per-
formed, if feasible, by the Board of Sentence Review previously recom-
mended. (This has already been done by administrative action.)
(4) That the reserve power of the Secretary to take action at any time
on the proceedings, findings, and sentence of a court martial be retained,
but that prior approval by the Secretary of any case not constitute a bar
to subsequent reconsideration, within a certain time limit.13 2
The present Navy Bill, in line with the majority of the committee recom-
mendations, substantially changes the present system of departmental review.
It retains the latter in part by providing that the proceedings, findings, and
sentence of every general court-martial shall, and of any other court martial
may, be reviewed as to legality in the Office of the judge Advocate General.
The Bill goes much further than the present system, however, by giving the
Judge Advocate General himself the power to set aside the proceedings,
findings, and sentence of anycourt martial. 33 In addition, the Bill provides
that the sentence of every general court martial, and of such other courts
martial as may be designated by the Secretary of the Navy, shall, under
such regulations as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe, be reviewed
by a clemency board appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, and that such
clemency board shall have the power to remit, mitigate, or commute the
sentence, in whole or in part, except a sentence imposed by a court martial
convened by the Secretary of the Navy or the President of the United States,
in which case like power shall repose in the convening authority. 34
The Bill further provides that any convicted person may, within one year
after he has been informed that review of his case has been completed,; re-
quest a fufther review by a board of appeals appoinied by the Secretary of
the Navy to serve in his office. Such board of appeal shall have the power
to take any action which could have been ,taken by the judge Advocate
General upon initial review, or by the clemency board. 35
The composition of the clemency board and of the board of appeals is not
defined by the Bill, but is to be determined by regulations of the Secretary.
The Bill does not, however, preclude civilian membership on these boards.
The Bill retains the present requirement of confirmation by the President
132 d. at § VII, pp. 236-240A.
133S. 1338, H. R. 3687, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. § 39, Art. 39(e) (1947).34Id. at Art. 39(f).
1351d. at Art. 39(g).
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of sentences of death and of dismissal of an officer, with a provision that
the President may empower the Secretary to confirm a sentence of dis-
missal.136 The Bill also provides that a sentence of discharge of an enlisted
man shall be executed only after confirmation by the Secretary or other
authority duly appointed by him. 3 7
The review of inferior court martial cases provided in the Bill follows the
same general procedure, except that the initial review as to legality and
clemency is to be made by the officer next senior in the chain of command
to the convening authority, if present or reasonably available, otherwise by
the convening authority.138 The Bill provides that the Judge Advocate
General may review such cases as to legality.139 Review of such cases by
the clemency board and by the board of appeals is made to depend upon
regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary.140
The Bill goes on to retain the present reserve power of the Secretary to
set aside the proceedings, or to remit or mitigate the sentence, of any naval
court martial, except a court martial convened by the President, and pro-
vides that in the latter case the President shall possess such power.141 The
anomaly referred to above, as to when this power may and may not be exer-
cised; is, however, not clarified.
In other words, the Bill adopts, in substance, the recommendations of the
General Court Martial Sentence Review Board on the subject of depart-
mental review, with the following exceptions:
(1) The initial legal review is left in the Office of the Judge Advocate
General, instead of being placed in a Board of Legal Review.
(2) Review by the Board of Appeal is not automatic, but requires an
appeal within one year by the convicted person.
(3) It is not clearly stated whether the Board of Appeal shall have the
power to review facts, as well as law.
(4) A question remains as to the extent of the reserve power of the
Secretary over sentences previously approved by him.
Space will not permit a detailed comparison of these provisions of the
Navy Bill with the already complicated review procedure, of the Army,1 42
or with the amendments thereto which have been proposed by the Army
13 61d. at Art. 39(a).
1371d. at Art 39(a) (c).
1381d. at Art. 39(i).
1391d. at Art. 39(e).
1401d.'at Art. 39(f) (g).
1411d. at Art. 39(h).
14241 STAT. 799 (1920), 10 U. S. C. A. §§ 1519-1524 (1940) ARTicLEs OF WAR 48-52.
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and by the House Armed Services Committee.143 It is bel'ieved, however,
that the system proposed by the Navy Bill is simpler, and affords a full
measure of protection to an accused person.
Judge Advocate General's Corps
In connection with the selection of the judge advocate, the prosecutor, and
the defense counsel of courts martial, and of reviewing officers, the important
question arises whether the Navy should have a separate corps of officers
comparable to the Judge Advocate General's Department in the Army. The
Ballantine Committee considered this question at some length. Its recom-
mendation was that such a corps should not be established in the Navy
Department, but that in its stead there be created a group of legal specialist
officers who would receive legal training and le assigned to perform legal
duties only, but who would be available to perform certain other duties now
assigned to so-called "unrestricted" line officers."4 This recommeridation
was approved by the Secretary and has been enacted into law.'4 5 Legal
specialist officers in the number of approximately 250, recruited from among
lawyers in the Naval Reserve, have accepted commissions in the regular
Navy.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that after World War I, the
Judge Advocate General of the Navy strongly recommended the formation
of a "permanent corps of judges advocate for the naval service." He also
recommended that the law be amended to require that a "law member sit
on every general court martial, whose advice upon legal questions arising in
connection with the hearing shall be binding upon the court, but who should
have no vote" upon questions of fact."'' 4 6 Although these recommendations
were noted with approval by the Secretary of the Navy, 47 apparently no
action was taken on them at the time.
The General Court Martial Sentence Review Board took the position that
the real question was whether qualified legal officers would be available to
fill the necessary positions of judge advocate, prosecutor, and defense counsel,
343H. R. REP. No. 1034, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 24-29 (Arts. 48-52) (1947).
14 4 RPORT OF BALLANTINE COMM. TO THE SEC'Y OF THE NAVY 9 (April 1946). The
special recommendations of the minority members disagreed with the majority on this
point, but their recommendations are somewhat complicated and no attempt will be
made to summarize them here. Judge McGuire stated that he adhered generally to
the latter.
145Pub. L. No. 381, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(a) (Aug. 7, 1947).
146Annual Report of the Judge Advocate General to the See'y of the Navy, published
in REPORT OF THE SEC'Y OF THE NAVY 323 (Sept. 1919).14 7 REPORT OF THE SEC'Y OF THE NAvY 130 (1919).
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and to act as reviewing officers, and whether these officers would be com-
pletely independent in the performance of their duties. The Board felt
that it did not matter especially whether these officers were designated as
legal specialists, or as members of a Judge Advocate General's corps, so
long as these essential requirements were fulfilled. Accordingly, its only
recommendations were that the judge advocate, the prosecutor, and the de-
fense counsel be lawyers, that they be certified as qualified by the Judge
Advocate General, and that they be rated solely by the judge Advocate
General in respect of the performance of their duties in these capacities, and
that the Judge Advocate General furnish qualified officers to present cases
to the Board of Legal Review and to the Board of Sentence Review.
14
The p~esent Navy Bill does not make any provisions for a separate Judge
Advocate General's Corps, and, in this respect, follows the recommendations
of the Ballantine Committee. The Navy Bill thus differs from the present
Army law, which provides for a Judge Advocate General's Department,'"
and is in marked contrast to the pending bill to amend the Articles of War,
as reported favorably by the iouse Commitee on Armed Services. °50 This
Bill provides, in Section 46, that the Judge Advocate General's Corps shall
consist of two major generals, three brigadier generals, and an active list
of commissioned officer strength to be determined by the Secretary of War
(but such strength to be not less than 1% per cent of the authorized active
list commissioned officer strength of the Regular Army and in addition
warrant officers and enlisted men in such numbers as the Secretary .of War
shall determine. The Bill further provides, in Section 47, that officers shall
be permanently appointed to this corps by the President, by and with the
advice of the Senate, and provides for a separate promotion list of all com-
missioned officers below the rank of brigadier general. Provision is also
made for transfer to the Judge Advocate General's Corps of qualified officers
from other branches of the Army, and for appointment of reserve officers
and qualified civilian graduates of accredited law schools. Section 48 pro-
vide8 that -the Judge Advocate Geneial shall be the legal adviser of the
Secretary of War, and that all members of the judge Advocate General's
Corps shall perform their duties under.the direction of the Judge Advocate
General. Section 49 provides that the Judge Advocate General (who is to
be a Major Gei ra1), the Assistant Judlge Advocate General (also a Major
14 REPORT OF GENERAL COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE RFVIEW BOARD TO THE SEC'Y OF
THE NAVY 77-78 92-94, 232, 234-235 (Jn. 1947).". T
14953 STAT. 558 (1939), 10 U. S. C. A .§§ 61-64;'(Supp. 1946), NATIONAL DEFENsE
AcT § 8. 1 . , .
150H. R. REP. No. 1034, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-49 "(1947).
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General), and the other general officers of the Judge Advocate General's
Corps shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, from among officers of the Judge Advocate General's
Corps recommended by the Secretary of War.
The stated purpose of these amendments is to establish in the Army a
corps of qualified legal officers who shall be entirely free from command
influence. The House Committee on Armed Services felt so strongly on this
subject that it wrote these amendments into the Army Bill as originally pro-
posed, despite the opposition of the Under-Secretary of War, Honorable
Kenneth C. Royall, and of Lt. General J. Lawton Collins, and retained
them in spite of "strenuous objections" of the Secretary of War, Honorable
Robert P. Patterson, and of the Chief of Staff, General Dwight D. Eisen-
howe.r. 15 1 Whether the Committee will insist on the insertion of similar pro-
visions in the Navy Bill remains to be seen.
Advisory Council
The General Court Martial Sentence Review Board recognized that no
single study of the court-martial system could be regarded as complete, and
that no changes could be regarded as permanent. Accordingly, it recom-
mended the establishment of an Advisory Council to make a continuing study
of the naval court-martial system and from time to time to recommend
changes based on its observation of the actual operation of the system and
on its appraisal of current trends in civilian criminology. It was recom-
mended that this Council be composed partly of persons outside the naval
service, partly of representatives of the Office of the Judge Advocate General
and of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and partly of officers with general
line experience; and that it include at least one penologist and one psychia-
trist. Such a Council, it was felt, could serve a two-fold purpose:
1. It could undertake a complete examination of the naval court-martial
system in action.
2. It could provide the means of keeping the court-martial system up to
date without the necessity of periodic major revisions.' 52
This recommendation was modeled after Mr. Justice Cardozo's original
proposal for the creation of a Ministry of Justice, 5 3 as well as the actual
-1H. R. REP. No. 1034, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-11 (1947).
15 2REPORT OF GENERAL COURT MARTIAL SENTENcE REviEw BOARD TO THE SEC'Y OF
THE NAVY, Introduction 2-5 (Jan. 1947).
'
5 3 Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARv. L. REv. 113 (1921).
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creation of the New York State Law Revision Commission,154 the New York
State Judicial Council,15 and the United States Supreme Court's Advisory
Committee on Civil and Criminal Procedure.156 It is interesting to note
that the Vanderbilt Committee, independently of the General Court Martial
Sentence Review Board, made a similar recommendation with respect to
the Army court martial system. 157
The present Navy Bill does not provide for the creation of an Advisory
Council, but it is understood that the Navy intends-to establish one by
administrative action. This will represent a salutary reform which should
obviate in advance the type of criticism which the Army and Navy court
martial systems have received since the close of World.War II.
The combination of a completely revised set of Articles for the Govern-
ment of the Navy, and a permanent Advisory Council, should mark the way
to a system of naval justice which will be the equal of any other code of
justice, whether military or civil. The problems are difficult; and the solu-
tions by no means simple; but they are not beyond the capacity of a great
democratic nation such as ours. The Army and Navy Bills, imperfect though
they may be, are a long step toward the great goal of equal justice for
all men.
154See REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NEw YORK
STATE (1934); N. Y. STATE LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENT, No. 50, pp. 36, 53.
155See Saxe, The Ju dicial Council of the State of New York: Its Objectives, Methods,
and Accomplishments, 35 Amr. POL. Sci. REv. 933 (1941).
'
5 6The Advisory Committee was appointed by orders of the Court dated June 3,
1935 (295 U. S. 774) and February 17, 1936 (297 U. S. 731), pursuant to 48 STAT. 1064
(1934), 28 U. S. C. A. § 723 b, c (1941). On January 5, 1942, it was designated as
a continuing Advisory Committee to advise the court with respect to proposed amend-
ments of or additions to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States (308 U. S. 645).1 57 REPoRT OF WAR DEP'T. ADVISORY CoMms. 0N MILITARY JUSTICE TO THE SEC'Y OF
WAR 14-1 (Dec. 1946).
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